By Lewis Sorley
A Harvest Book, 507 pp, 1999
This is a very serious book. It's
packed with detail and analysis from previously unrevealed sources and
first-hand interviews. That's both a good and bad thing. Good because
Sorley makes his case very well, bad because sometimes the detail gets a
bit monotonous and tedious. But, overall, this is a fine book that is sure
to challenge some commonly held beliefs about the Vietnam War.
As the subtitle makes clear, Sorley deals
exclusively with the latter half of the war, namely from General Creighton
Abrams' promotion to commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1968 to the
final U.S. pullout in 1975. Sorley concludes that this period of the war
was vastly different from the first half - different tactics, different
strategy, different and better results. It was, in essence, a better war.
Abrams' successor was General Westmoreland,
and he preferred large divisions that searched for the enemy in the
jungles. This caused high casualties, confusion among the ranks,
logistical difficulties, and lowered morale, especially among the enlisted
Abrams arrived with a different strategy.
Rather than search-and-destroy with large divisions, he preferred
secure-and-hold with smaller units. He believed that the war would be won
at the village level. The villages must remain safe from North Vietnam
Army (NVA) attacks and Viet Cong infiltrations. Once that happened, the
larger cities like Saigon could go on the offensive and secure themselves
from enemy shelling. With the cities and villages secure, the South
Vietnamese could organize their own forces, units that included village,
city, and regional troops. Once that was done, the U.S. Army could slowly
leave the ground fighting to the South Vietnamese while supplying air
cover, supplies, and advice.
According to Sorley, by 1972 this strategy
had succeeded, so well that the war could have been considered won. The
villages were safe and secure, the VC was no longer a factor, and the NVA
was nowhere in South Vietnam. Massive U.S. air strikes had slowed the flow
of NVA troops and war equipment to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
So if all this is true, then what happened?
Why did the communists win the war? Several reasons, according to Sorley:
- Lack of support from the politicians at
home. Congress and the Nixon Administration were more concerned with
pulling out and less concerned with victory. By 1972, Abrams had fewer
than 50,000 troops at his disposal, which makes his achievements even
- Unflagging support for the North from
China and the Soviet Union. When the Paris agreement was ratified, and
the North immediately violated it by flooding the South with troops
and tanks, the U.S. failed in its promise to punish the North with air
support. The Communists proved better allies than the U.S., because
they kept the North well-stocked, while the South steadily ran out of
- North Vietnamese officials kept in
constant contact with the anti-war movement in America, using it to
spread communist propaganda and lies. This undermined public support
for the war, which at one time was high.
This is the essence of Sorley's book. It's
a powerful case. What I found sad was America's total abandonment of South
Vietnam. We had fought for years to keep the country from communist
domination and then threw it all away when victory was so close.
It was not our finest hour.